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RUDOLF STAMMIER'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW
GEORGE

H. SABINE*

INTRODUCTION
Who is Rudolf Stammler and why does the Cornell Law Quarterly
publish an account of his philosophy? The answer is that Rudolf

Stammler is a figure in one of the present-day phases of legal education, namely the study of law abstractly, philosophically, and indeed critically under the heading of "Jurisprudence".
At Cornell the subject is taught under the inspiration of Roscoe
Pound, to whose lifetime labors jurisprudence in America is deeply
indebted. For years, at the Harvard Law School, Pound has been
treating the topic in a manner truly Olympian. Analyzing the juristic
ideas of primitive times and medieval times and modern times, he
traces the schemes whereby societies of different times and places
impact upon the individual the interests of other individuals and of
the group. He ranges over savage law, barbaric law, and civilized
law, ancient and modern. Greek Law and Roman Law, Civil Law
and Common Law are all made to pass as in a panorama, and as the
scroll unrolls, great figures in the history of human thought find
places upon it-Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, St. Augustine, Justinian,
Accursius, Bartolus, St. Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson. With Kant and Hegel,
Pound carries the stream of ideas down to the nineteenth century
where Bentham, Austin, and von Ihering and Savigny are brought
into it, and so on to the present day, still graced by Holmes and
illumined by Cardozo. Making the nineteenth century a dividing
point in the current, Pound splits the subject in that century into
schools,1 the historical, the analytical, the metaphysical, according
to the mental slants of such men as Maine, Austin, and Hegel, who
respectively approached juristic philosophy from the different angles
indicated by the names of the schools. He then notes the recent rise
*Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University.
'Isaacs, The Schools of Iurisprudence(1918) 31 HARV. L. R.EV 373.
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of new schools which accent the social implications of law, among
them the NeoKantians, of whom he makes Rudolf Stammler the
chieftain. Then he uses Stammler, among others, to personify
the ideals of a transition period introductory to Pound's own offering
of sociological jurisprudence,2 the contribution of the twentieth
century. Thus is Stammler placed in Pound's scheme of things.
Pound credits Stammler with turning legal philosophy away from
its habit of relating morals and ethics to merely abstract legal rules,
and turning it toward relating them to the problem of justice in the
administration of the law in concrete cases. Rules which are abstractly just may not give actually just results in application, and it is
the achievement of concretely just results, which seems to Stammler
to be the objective in law. Since Stammler felt that the criterion of
justice was some social ideal, Pound puts him among the social
philosophical jurists of the transition stage. 3
Stammler's writings and the writings of others which Stainniler's
writings have provoked appear in Professor Sabine's footnotes and
will not be referred to here. Stanmmler was a professor of jurisprudence at the University of Berlin until he became emeritus a few years
ago. Born in 1856 he is still living at the time this issue goes to
press.
Professor Sabine's paper follows.
G. H. RoBINsoN*

From the very beginning of political philosophy, men have dreamed
of an exact science of government and law, a science which should
teach not mainly the more efficient use of means but more especially
the wiser and more foresighted choice of ends. One thinks naturally
of Plato, who could find no just ground for the authority of man
over man except the greater intellectual excellence of the ruler and
who defined the wisdom of his philosopher-king as chiefly a knowledge
of the Good. An intellectualist to the core, he found in human nature
no radical evil which prevented men from pursuing a good once
clearly perceived, but rather a blindness which made them grope
vaguely for a good only half perceived. Accordingly, Plato looked to
education, and especially to a professional education in mathematics
and logic, to produce that clarity of insight, sureness of grasp, and
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

TPound, The Scope and Purposeof SociologicalJurisprudence(i911) 24 HARV. L.
REv. 34o, (1911) 25 HARv. L.REV. 591 .
3Pound's discussion of Stammler is to be found in (1911) 25 HARV. L. RV. at
147.
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methodical skill upon which alone, as he believed, a true understanding of political and social values could be built. When all allowance
has been made for difference of time and place, the underlying purpose
of Rudolf Stamnnler's philosophy of law is not substantially different
from that of Plato, nor is this comparison merely fanciful, for the
German philosophy which Stamnnler has tried to follow owed its inspiration in no small degree to the study of Plato. For Staniler as
for Plato, the hope of the law is that it may be, so nearly as human
frailty permits, an "impersonal reason" and that reason may give it a
firm grasp, reinforced by a scientific method, upon the ultimate end
to be attained in human cooperation.
It was for this reason that Stammler, from the beginning of his
profe sional career, was convinced that an historical or an analytical
method in jurisprudence overlooks an indispensable element of the
subject3a-a standard by means of which the law as it is can be
criticised and valued. Not that he doubted the need for analysis and
historical study, but only that he thought them insufficient. Possibly
Stammler's criticism of historical jurisprudence is less than just-he
believes that it stands or falls with the romantic hypothesis of the
Volksgeist and has proved nothing except that all positive law is
dependent upon historical conditionsb-but he stands here upon a
simple principle: no tracing of the steps by which anything has come
to be can show that it ought to be. Consequently, while a knowledge
of the way in which a law has taken shape may be indispensable for
understanding what it now is, the history does not justify it, and if
the final question to be answered concerns its justice, both historical
study and juristic classification must be secondary to criticism-the
estimation and valuation of a particular law in the total aim and plan
of the law-and to this question jurisprudence must address itself.
Perhaps the time was ripe, in Stamnnler's early years, for someone
to restate this ancient position. The controversy over the German
Civil Code, between the publication of the first draft in 1887 and the
adoption of the final revision in 1895, was in some sense a defeat for
the historical school, with its preference for case-law. In any case
Staunler's studies as a Romanist had convinced him that the crowning achievement of the Roman Law was the effort of the great jurists
of the classical age to make the law an ars boni et aequi. They had,
indeed, lacked a sure scientific method for accomplishing this, and it
2aStamler's earliest professional work was a criticism of historical jurisprudence: Uber die Methode der geschichtlichen Rechtstheorie FESTGABE ZU BERNHARD
WINDSCHEInS FiNFZIGJAHRIGEN DOKTORJUBILUm

(I888).

3bFundarmentalTendencies in Modern Jurisprudence(1923)
pp. 646-654;

LEHRBUCH DER RECHTSPHiLOSOPHIE (1921;

21 MIcH. L. REv.
3. Aufi., 1928), § x6.
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became the ambition of Stammler's life to supply such a method,
but they had felt their way with true inspiration in this direction.
"This, in my opinion, is the universal significance of the classical
Roman jurists; this, their permanent worth. They had the courage
to raise their glance from the ordinary questions of the day to the
whole. And in reflecting on the narrow status of the particular case,
they directed their thoughts to
the guiding star of all law, namely, the
3c
realization of justice in life."
Certainly it was true that during Stammler's formative years
the rapid industrializing of Germany, under strong state-guidance,
was introducing social changes not readily to be controlled by the
historical law, and also changes in the law not very obviously related
to its spontaneous growth. The very effort of the government to
stand sponsor for the social changes required by this new industrial
order had served to make an intelligent public more conscious of the
problems. By i8So, twelve years of experience had proved that
Bismarck's effort to repress the Socialist Party was a failure, while his
legislation to "dish" the Socialists had taken most advanced ground
on the question of social responsibility for individual welfare. 4 It was
almost at this juncture that Stammler and his friend Paul Natorp,
the distinguished neo-Kantian and student of Plato in the so-called
Marburg School of philosophy, came forward with a revision, amounting to a complete reversal, of the Marxian philosophy which formed
the official creed of party-socialism in Germany. Like Hermann
Cohen, the founder of the School, Natorp felt a deep sympathy
with the humanitarian purposes of socialism and held a social philosophy which he would have been glad to call socialism, but he was
utterly at odds with the theories of economic determinism and of
class-struggle, as well as with the metaphysical materialism of the
Marxians. His social philosophy was in fact developed around
the ideal of a thoroughly socialized moral education,' and the fundamental idea in it was Platonic-a three-fold division of social functions. This was qualified, however, by the Kantian idea of unlimited
progress toward a moral end, which Plato would hardly have acIcDiE LEHRE vON DEm RICHTIGEN RECHTE (1902; Neue Aufl., 1926), Bk. I
C. v. Sect. 5. Referred to hereafter as RIcETIGEs RECHT. I have quoted the
English translation, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1925) p. 127.
4
Sickness insurance, 1883; accident insurance, 1884; old age insurance, 1889.

WFirst put forward in

RELIGION INNEREALB DER GRENZEN DER HUuANITXT

(1894) and enlarged in SOZIALPXDAGOGIK (1899; 5. Aufl., 1922). The latter was
dedicated to Stammler and Stnamler's WIRTscHAFT UND REcHT NACH DER
MATERIALISTISCHEN GESCEICHTSAUFFASSUNG (1896) to Natorp. Stammler had
been professor of law at Marburg earlier.
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cepted. "Social life, whatever stage it may reach, never becomes
static; it must be conceived as continually in process. For this
reason its moral order becomes an eternal problem, its virtue becomes
an ideal, that is, merely the reference-point of an infinite development."6 The directing force in human society is intelligent construction (bildendes Tdtigkeit) and the chief means is the socializing of
the will through education. Of all social theories, socialism is least
able to dispense with an ethical point of view. If it knew what it
were about, it would see that materialism is an utterly incongruous
philosophy upon which to build its social policy.
In this it is easy to recognize an ideology characteristic of the last
two decades of the nineteenth century. In England and America, it
produced both an enthusiasm for Spencer's evolutionism quite unsupported by scientific evidence and also the revulsion against
naturalism which made the Oxford idealism for the time being the
prevailing form of academic philosophy. This English and American
idealism was not wholly unlike the German movement "back to
Kant", of which Cohen and Natorp were in i8go the most distinguished protagonists, though a long immersion in a sensationalist
tradition made Hegel more palatable to English thinkers than he
could be to Germans. In social philosophy it produced, in the person
of Thomas Hill Green, a kind of social idealism not incomparable
with that of Natorp and Stamnmler, if due allowance be made for
differences of terminology. In both cases the proposition that man
is by nature a social being-vague and trite as it may appear to uscame with the force of a discovery, and in both, despite a technical
dependence upon Kant, a return to the classical tradition of Plato
and Aristotle was a real motive. In England the criticism of political and economic individualism had a significance which it necessarily lacked in Germany, where Marx was perhaps the natural
object of attack. But in both countries, there was ample reason why
a newly-awakened sense of social responsibility should have called
forth the thesis that society is fundamentally a spiritual phenomenon
from which an ideal dimension can never be fully eradicated.
In the partnership of Natorp and Stammler, however, it fell to the
part of Staunnler to make an extended analysis of the theory of
socialism, in his brilliant work on the relation between jurisprudence
and the materialist interpretation of history.7 In this extremely
acute criticism of the Marxian philosophy the most substantial
6
7

SozIALPADOGOGIK (1922) P. 179.
WIRTScHAFT UND REcuT NACH DER MATERIALISTISCEEN GESCICHTSAUFFAS-

SUNG (1896; 3. Ai.,

1914).
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elements of all Stammler's later work are to be found. The conclusion of the criticism is that the economic interpretation of historyor, more specifically, the thesis that changes in law and government
follow causally or logically from changes in technology-is vague and
ill-developed. So far is it from being a fact that law adjusts itself
automatically to changes in the mode of producing goods, that the
class-struggle upon which the socialist theory depends is due precisely to the failure to make such adjustments. The technology
changes and the law does not, but remains a legal anachronism which
throws the whole system out of adjustment. The materialist theory
is a bad figure of speech: if society readjusted itself to every change
as the stresses and strains are redistributed in a moving physical
system, there would be no lag and no conflict.8 The economist tries
to cover his bad theory by some such saving clause as that the law
adjusts itself "in the long run" to the new economy, but as Stamnnler
rightly points out, this phrase is worse than meaningless if the changes
in question form a closed mechanical system. Social conflicts like the
class-struggle indicate a lack of fitness in the law to the social arrangements which it ought to regulate; the essence of the socialist
position is that private ownership of goods produced is a suitable
arrangement in a handicraft-society and is not suitable in a capitalist
society. But fitness or suitability, and their opposites, are teleological conceptions referring not to causes and effects but to means
and ends. They cannot possibly be defined unless it be recognized
that law tries to regulate the co-operative efforts by which men
produce goods, to protect the interests that appear in such co-operation, and to adjust the human relationships involved for some
socially valuable end. The practical efforts of party-socialism always
do surreptitiously introduce such valuations of social maladjustment,
even while in theory it asserts that there is nothing in society except a
system of material forces. "One does not organize political parties in
favor of eclipses of the moon." 9 The confusion here, according to
Stamnmler, is ultimately an ambiguity in the conception of necessity.
Social necessity affects the will; it is the necessity of a means for the
sake of an end and it applies to a human agent who "must do something about" the matter in question. In a causal series, on the other
hand, if all the conditions for a result are factually present, it is nonsense to talk about doing anything; the result merely happens and
that ends the matter.
This confusion, Stanmnler believes, has prevented the socialists
from analysing adequately the concept of society, and hence from
sWiRTscaAT UND RECHT

§

72.

I have used the first edition.

'/

.d§ 77.
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understanding social conflict and social change and the relation of
law and economics in society. When this analysis is supplied the
social materialism of Marx is replaced by a social idealism. Social
economy, as Stammler uses the term, applies to any cooperative
effort for the satisfaction of needs and therefore to interchanges of
goods or services of any sort, whether physical or spiritual.10 The
attempt to set aside a special class of economic needs as lower leads
only to confusion." Now wherever co-operative effort takes place, it
must be regulated, that is to say, it cannot be left merely to inclination. There must be some sort of rule or standard to govern human
conduct toward other human beings in the process of acting together
and living together. And wherever such a regulating standard exists
there is a society and the society is created by the existence of the
standard. In fact, there are several types of such social standardsrules of morality, of custom, of law, and even of etiquette. 12 This
does not mean that there is necessarily a state, for the state, where it
exists at all-and Stammler regards it as relatively a recent institution-is itself an association within society and therefore the
creature of law.13 The root of the matter is that men do satisfy their
needs co-operatively-the conduct of one is a means to the ends of
another and in turn the conduct of that other is a means to the ends
of the first-and this requires binding rules subjecting the wills of the
various co-operating parties to the ends to be achieved by cooperation. The existence of such rules is what makes a society.
From this it follows that economic conflicts and economic pressure
take place within the social circle created by common standards of
conduct. Apart from such standards generally accepted as binding,
there are no institutions, such as marriage, property, or'crime, and
therefore no economic institutions. For institutions are not simply
events or facts but are rather states of will; they consist altogether in
the fact that there are certain socially approved ways of behaving
and that such standards are admitted as properly binding. Economic
pressure or economic conflict, therefore, can exist only as they affect
the will and the rules by which it is regulated; they are discrepancies
between the rules and the end sought. The thesis that economic
arrangements make law is at least confused, and in one sense it is
quite false. Unless there were law, institutions, binding standards of
behavior, there would be no economy at all. Stammler's fundamental
'0 Natorp, following Plato, had offered a three-fold classification of social servvices, Ernahrung,Regierung, Bildung, though each involves aspects of the others.
SOZLAIPADAGOGIK § 17.
'WMTSCET uND RECHT § 29.
121bid. §§ 16-17.
3
2 THEORIE DR REcHTswISSENSCAIFT (1911; 2. Aufl., 1923) C. v.

§ 10.
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thought at this point is not in principle very different from what was
later called institutional economics, though he never developed it in
the direction of an empirical study of institutions. He is interested
mainly in showing that it is false to look at society as if it were divided
between economics and law, or to regard law as a mere superstructure
upon a system of economy. They are in fact two sides of the same
thing, viz., cooperative effort to satisfy needs and the regulation of
such effort in the light of the end sought. Obviously Stammler
might go as far as any socialist in admitting that, at a given time,
law does work badly as a regulator of social conflicts and that the
maladjustment follows a change of technology. He could consistently go any length in advocating legal reform to gain a more
effective adjustment of interests and a larger satisfaction of needs,
though unfortunately this side of the question interested him little. 14
His contention against Marxism is that the conflict and its adjustment both take place in the region of human conduct, or human will.
A physical change, such as a new technical process, cannot affect law
except as it influences volition and makes necessary a new regulation
of volition, and in such a case the necessity is that of a means to an
end.
We can now understand the enormous importance which Stammler
attaches to the economic interpretation of history and the great
effects that his criticism of it had in forming his own social philosophy.
With some exaggeration he asserts that Marxism is the first and only
attempt to find a single law or principle for the explanation of social
phenomena." In its purpose it was right, though a faulty analysis of
concepts-in this case that of society especially-led it to a wrong
conclusion. By such a criticism, carried through as he believes with
greater thoroughness, Stammler arrives at the "social idealism"
sketched above. In order to understand the later development of his
thought, we must note carefully both what he professes to do and
the method by which he proposes to do it. The method is analysis
of concepts; Stammler professes to deal always with a thoughtapparatus and not with the objects conceived. Similarly his results
profess to present only the use of concepts. His examination of
socialism, for example, is singularly free from any judgment whatever upon the specific ends or policies of the party; the book centers
in the concept of a society and its use in the understanding of social
4

According to Professor V. G. Simkhovitch Stammler's criticism of socialism in
W rTSCRAFT uND-REcHT really did influence the reformist wing of the German
Socialist Party. Rudolf Stammler (1904) 27 EDUCATIoNAL REVIEW pp. 250 f.;
quoted by John C. H. Wu, Stammler and his CriticsTHE THEORY OF JUSTICE
1
WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT § S.
(1925), Appendix II, p. 565.
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change and social conflicts. To this notion of his task all Stammler's
later work conforms.
If we turn back now to Stammler's early dissatisfaction with
historical and positivist jurisprudence, we are in a better position to
see the problem as he sees it. The history or the analysis of positive
law offers no means of criticising the law in the light of just results,
and this amounts to the omission of a major fact about the law. For
as a matter of fact justice is recognized, more or less vaguely, as an
end which the law ought on the whole to realize, and this recognition
has its place in law itself, witness such conceptions as equity, good
faith, good morals, or the rule of reasonableness. But Stammler is not
at all content to insist upon a fact. As he himself very well knew,
there was nothing novel about the idea that law is a means to an end.
In itself this opinion would not distinguish him from Ihering. But
Ihering, he feels, was a sort of impressionist; he had no adequate
method to support the proposition or to bring the consideration of
ends within the scope of a scientific jurisprudence. 16 Any merely
factual or psychological mitigation of strict law in behalf of justice is
insufficient;' Stammler has never believed that jurisprudence could
accomplish anything by appealing to a natural feeling of right or
sense of justice, because there is no presumption that popular opinion
is more validly just than the positive law itself. Neither has he much
trust in judicial discretion or in what is called "free decision", for
he believes that a well-made code is in general more reliable. 8 Nor
can we arrive at a valid definition of justice by improving the economic and social education of practitioners. 9 Finally, the question
is not to be turned over to ethics or philosophy in the pious hope that
someone else has a light not vouchsafed to jurists.2 The problem
belongs to law. Good faith or good morals, as the jurist appeals to
them, are legal rather than ethical conceptions.
The problem, then, belongs to jurisprudence, to a critical examination of the concept of law itself, and the vital question is one of
validity. It is quite true to say that Stammler's works deal almost
wholly with modes of legal reflection, with the way to think about and
to decide legal questions, but this statement needs to be properly
understood. Stammler himself would say that he considers legal reflection from the point of view of a legal logician and not from the
16 (1923) 21 Mica. L. Rxv. pp. 782-785; Cf. R CUTIGES RECHT, ConCl., § I.
7RCHT1GEs RECT, Bk. I, C. v.
'Legislation and JudicialDecision (1925) 23 Mica. L. REv. pp. 362 ff.
19
RICRTIGES R ECT, Intro., § i.
20
WIRTscHArT uN] REcnT § 87. Cf. the distinction between law and ethics in
RICHTIGES REcar, Bk. I, C. ii.
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point of view of a psychologist. That is to say, the question is not
how judges do decide cases-the sort of self-examination that largely
makes up a book like Mr. justice Cardozo's Nature of the Judicial
Process-buthow they ought to decide them if the decision is to be
objectively just. What Stammler has tried to supply.is the norm or
standard to be used in criticising and weighing the results of the
judicial process and not biographical facts about judges and the way
they think. On the other hand, it need not be supposed that Stammler is indifferent to the actual results. Quite the contrary. There
can be no doubt that it has always been a major purpose with ,him
to combat the legal technicians, who treat the "workshop of the law"
as if it were an end in itself. It is just this narrow professionalism
that is responsible for legal formalism and that brings the law into
bad repute among laymen.2' But the only sure way to combat it is to
prove scientifically that objective justice can be defined and used as a
jurist's tool. Unless there be a standard above the preference of an
individual or a class, there can be no valid defense of a legislative
policy or a judicial decision. Unless the standard of justice can be
discovered by critical examination and stated as a principle, it cannot be used in testing positive law as a means to an end. Stammler's
problem as he saw it was to state the end of law, to show that the
statement really is sound, and to discover a method which would
enable him to do these two things.
This aim of Stammler-to prove that the principle of justice can
be stated in such a way as to guide juristic thought-is the reason
why he has properly been counted among the proponents of a revived natural law. He himself gave currency to this view of his work
by inventing the much quoted phrase, "Natural law with changeable
content".2 Perhaps his popular success frightened him; at all events
he has allowed this catch-word to fall into disuse. However, it was
never Stammler's intention to revive natural law in anything much
like its historic form. He never believed in the existence of an ideal or
perfect law over and above the positive law, nor has he ever held that
any legal rule is unchangeable or free from the conditions of historical
time and place. just law is a part of positive law. All positive law
"tries" to be just, though it may not succeed, and for this reason as a
whole it is never purely positive or factual. It has, so to speak, an
ideal dimension that projects it toward an unrealized end, but this
effort toward the ideal is a phase of positive law itself. Over and
above the rules at any time formulated, there is nothing except a
21

RICHTIGES RECHT, Intro.,
WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT §
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§ i.
33, title; changed in the second edition.

STAMMLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
point of view which makes it possible to criticise the law as it is in
terms of its success or failure in approximating its own end, viz.,
justice. In Stammler's Kantian terminology, justice is exclusively
methodological or regulative. It has no content and lays down no
rule but is purely an "Idea" to be used in guiding legal thought.2
After this brief survey of the ideas which shaped Stammler's
earlier work, it is possible to sum up the main purposes that he has
had in view. In the first place, he set out from a feeling of dissatisfaction with positivist and historical jurisprudence, founded upon
the conviction that it results in treating the formulation and technicalities of the law as if they had a value of their own, whereas they
are really means to an end, a social agency by which action in concert
is regulated and directed toward the social ends co-operatively sought.
In order to show effectively the presence and the validity of an end in
law, it is necessary, in the second place, actually to formulate the
principle of justice and to show how it can be used by jurists in criticising and evaluating the technical rules of the law. Stammler therefore undertakes to exhibit an ideal principle implicit in actual law
and, by stating the principle explicitly, to make it a better instrument
of criticism and guidance. It was obviously not sufficient for his
purpose, however, to offer merely a verbal definition of justice which
can be taken or not as one chooses. In the third place, therefore,
and with growing emphasis, Stannnler addressed himself to the
problem of proving scientifically that his definition of justice really
presents a necessary and indubitable aspect of law. It is upon the
methodology of jurisprudence, accordingly, that Stanmmler's emphasis has fallen most heavily and it is quite impossible to present his
work as he himself sees it unless this emphasis be preserved. Whatever value the future may put upon his work, he claims to have introduced into jurisprudence a "critical" method, modeled upon the
critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which makes possible a valid
theory of legal knowledge, as he believes that Kant's philosophy first
made possible a theory of the knowledge attained in the natural
sciences. It is by his success or failure in this project that Stammler
would choose to be judged. Difficult and forbidding as the subject
may be to any but a technically trained student of philosophy,
the canon of scholarly accuracy forbids us to seek for any other
center about which to gather Stammler's teaching. It is of course
possible that his importance in the long run-if he achieves a longterm importance in the history of legal science-may consist in some231bM.

§ 7.
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thing different from what he supposes, but in his own estimation his
one service has been the creation of a legal logic, or theory of knowledge, on a Kantian model.
II
The ideal of a critical science of legal methodology has continually
grown upon Stammler as his thought matured. In his earliest important work, his Wirtschaft und Recht, it is largely implicit. Most of
his characteristic ideas already appear in this work and in a form
not substantially different from their. later form, but the rigor of
method which he later affects is not yet there, unquestionably to the
great advantage of the style. In this work, he is mainly concerned
with formulating and maturing his own theory of social idealism
through a criticism of the social materialism of the Marxians. In his
next important work, the Ricktiges Recht, he singles out for special
treatment the definition of justice and the description of its use as a
guiding ideal, doubtless because this problem had emerged from his
earlier work as the chief constructive idea in his jurisprudence.
Naturally, therefore, the theory of just law 'has been the idea most
characteristically attached to Stammler's name. From the point of
view of Stammler's system, however, just law is a conclusion rather
than a premise; it requires an elaborate critical apparatus to give it
scientific support. This he supplied in his Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft. Here the theory of just law appears in its proper place, as the
concluding step in a science of juristic logic, modeled conscientiously
on an analogy with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In this book
Stammler formulates what he calls "pure" jurisprudence, a logical
analysis of the concept of law, designed to exhibit the indispensable
elements of that concept, and quite without reference to the analysis
of historical or actual law.2 We must now try to describe briefly
how Stammler envisages this science and the method by which its
validity is proved.
The starting-point is one that is common to all philosophies derived
from Kant-a radical distinction between Sein and Sollen. To an
English-speaking person it is perhaps easiest to translate these words
by Fact and Value.2 The distinction amounts to this: The question
whether anything exists or is real as a part of nature is one thing;
24
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, Intro., § 7. Stammiler has summarized his whole
philosophy in his LEHRBUCH DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1921, 3. ALf., 1928).

uFor special reasons Stammler objects to the word Wert, used by other KantRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT C. vi, §§ 17-18. The objection does not invalidate the comparison for understanding the distinction of
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the question whether anything is as it ought to be, or whether it is
good or bad, is another. In terms of human faculties the first question
belongs to perception, the second to desire or will. The two represent
broadly different attitudes or approaches to the world. The first
takes things as it finds them, being concerned only to know what
they are and what they do. When it is developed, this attitude
issues in the conception of nature as a system of causes and effects
within which every event can be explained through its spatial, temporal, or causal relations to other events. In the world thus conceived there is neither good nor bad, nothing has value, and it is
meaningless to say that anything ought to be other than it is. The
second attitude, on the contrary, looks at the world as the theater of
human action; it consists of tasks to be done, of results to be realized
or avoided. Its constituents are means and ends, and this is a radically different relation from cause and effect since it projects itself
beyond the fact and envisages a future state as the ground or reason
for the present act. Cause and effect is a factual dependence of consequents upon antecedents, looking from the present backward;
means and end is an ideal dependence of antecedents upon consequents for the sake of which they are chosen, looking from the present
forward.
Assuming this distinction, more or less shared by all Kantians,
Stammler next proceeds to take a long step beyond Kant, though he
carefully preserves the analogy with Kant. Corresponding to the
distinction between Sein and Sollen, he supposes that there should
be two radically distinct types of science, a science of nature (Naturwissenschaft) in terms of the relation of cause and effect, and a science
of ends (Zweckwissenschaft) in terms of the relation of means and
end. 2 The ground for this supposition is that in both fields we do in
fact take for granted that valid (that is, not merely personal or subjective) distinctions can be drawn. In the realm of fact we assume
the distinction between true and false; in so far as any proposition
claims to report what is actually in the world, it must be correct or
incorrect. But equally we go on the supposition that there is a real
difference of values. In so far as anyone asserts that one act is good
and another bad, that a law is unjust and should be repealed while
another is right and should be enforced, he is professing to appeal to a
28

For Kant there is no science of ends, partly because his ethics is directed from

the start toward the metaphysical postulates-God, freedom, and immortalityand so is not empirical, and partly because he is convinced that all science must be
of the type of mechanics. Stammler might plausibly argue that both these
reasons had more to do with Kant's personal convictions than with the logic of his
philosophy.
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valid standard of right and wrong. There are then, Stammler argues,
two types of valid standard, the standard of truth and the standard
of right, and on each it should be possible to erect a science (or class of
sciences). For a valid standard presupposes regularity (Gesetzmnussigkeit) or conformity to general laws. The character of the laws
will, of course, be different in the two classes of science: in natural
science they will be laws of causation; in the sciences of end they will
be teleological. As natural science works in the light of complete
causal explanation as its goal, so teleological science must presume an
ultimate end or an ultimate right toward which less ultimate ends
contribute.
Now Stammler is fully convinced that Kant has shown regularity
or conformity to law in natural science to depend upon a certain
structure or form in scientific concepts, because unless we assumed
that all empirical events will in fact have this form, we should not
be able to find any regularity at all among such objects. Thus, for
example, we cannot, in general, find any uniformity except as things
arrange themselves in such great types of order as time, space, or
causality, and every specific scientific law, like gravitation for instance, is merely a statement of what we find by experience that the
behavior of objects is in terms of these most general and indispensable
kinds of order. Such orders Stammler, like Kant, calls forms; they
are scientifically indispensable because without them there is no way
of discovering regularity in nature. Nature in fact is nothing except
a space-time-causal framework in which every possible empirical
event must be assumed to fall. Their scientific indispensability is the
ultimate logical justification for believing them to be true.
Mutatis mutandis Stamnler now proposes to apply exactly the
same reasoning to his supposed class of telic sciences. Every desire
or need or inclination must be supposed to occur within a framework or order of means and ends.. If this were not the case, there
would be no difference of value or rightness between different inclinations but all would be on the same level of subjective feeling. As
we have seen, Stammler assumes that this is not the case; he assumes
that the distinction between mere inclination and justified will is as
unavoidable as the distinction between mere opinion and truth. This
distinction being granted, all that is involved in making the distinction must be granted too. It must be supposed, therefore, that
there are forms or orders as pervasive of the world of ends as time,
space, and causality are of the natural world. Such formal factors
must be involved in every actual case of volition, and they are the
conditions which make it possible to assign a specific end to a place
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in an objective system of means and end. It is of course true that
the forms by themselves do not enable us to say what actually is the
right or justified means to a given end, any more than the law of
causality permits us to say what does in fact cause malarial fever.
But if we work in the light of the causal hypothesis we can isolate the
regular collocations of events in the particular case, and if we work
in the light of the hypothesis that means are regulated by ends, we can
place a particular purpose in its proper relation of value to other
purposes. Every actual case of means and end is of course empirical;
it occurs in a historical context and concerns individual persons who
are actuated by desires of a subjective and personal sort. Nevertheless, all cases conform to a general type of relationship and must so
conform if they are to be united in the system of means and ends,
just as all causes must illustrate the principle of causality if they are
to be united in the system of nature.
Now Stammler's "pure jurisprudence" (reineRechtslehre) professes
to isolate these pure forms of telic relation, or at least those involved
in law; had he chosen to do so, he might have named his book the
"Critique of Pure Juristic Reason". Following the analogy of Kant
again, he supposes the pure forms of volition to be of two sorts, which
he calls respectively concepts (Begriff) or categories and idea (Idee).
The concepts are necessarily present in every individual case of law;
together these factors form the "essence" (Wesen) of law and hence
in the absence of any of them law itself would vanish. The idea
(possibly we should translate "ideal", to avoid the psychological
connotations of our English word) represents the goal of a completely systematic explanation in terms of means and end. Completeness is, in fact, never attained, but the effort in that direction is a
necessary guiding or "regulating" ideal in using the categories.
Stammler's meaning may be illustrated by the parallel distinction
between cause and effect, which characterizes every natural event,
and the uniformity of nature, which characterizes no single event but
represents a goal of complete scientific explanation such that all
events whatsoever are gathered into the net of a single causal system.
In Stammler's usage the "idea" is equivalent to what he had already
described as just law, since justice is the ideal principle or goal toward
which all positive law strives, though it is actually attained in none.
Justice in jurisprudence has, therefore, the same logical standing and
use that the uniformity of nature has in natural science; we never
know what it means in detail because every new detail adds to it, but
as a working hypothesis it is present in every scientific operation.
What Stammler now proposes to do is to buttress the idea of just
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law by showing the formal factors in all law, or in other words to discover a table of legal categories (the analogy with Kant's table of
categories is explicit and obvious) necessarily present in every case
where the concept of law is used. It is an intrinsic part of his methodology that this investigation should be in no way dependent upon an
inductive examination of laws, because induction could never prove
that any factor was necessary or universal. The method to be
followed must consist in what Stamnler calls a "critical" analysis of
the conception itself, without reference to the empirical content which
must be included in every actual instance of law. The concept of
law must have its own essence (Wesen), that is, its own peculiar constellation of factors without which it could not subsist. The gist of
the critical method, therefore, is this: Think away meanings which
attach to the concept of law until you find those meanings which, if
removed, would destroy the concept itself. When you have reached
the irreducible minimum whose absence would cause the conception
of law to vanish, you will have reached a definition not merely verbal
but whose constituents are intrinsic and necessary. This will give
you the underlying (or constitutive) principles which all jurisprudence
must use in its further examination, whether analytic or historical,
of the positive law. The crux of Stammler's juristic methodology
lies in his belief that such criticism reaches demonstrable results; or
otherwise stated, that criticism thus understood is a logical method,
distinct from either induction or deduction but, scientifically, at least
27
upon a parity with them.
When we examine the results which Stammler claims to reach by
the use of this critical method, we find that they are in fact very
similar to those reached in his earlier works with less pretense of
logical rigor.2 8 The meeting or cooperation of wills as mutually a
means to one another is the formal characteristic of any society,
and a society is constituted only by the existence of a binding or
relating (verbindend) will distinct from the subject-wills united by it.
Such a will sets a rule or standard above subjective inclinations and
also distinct from moral standards of character or internal perfection.
All such will, however, is not law. The law is distinguished from other
ways of regulating social cooperation by the fact, first, that is binding
in its own right (selbstherrlich),in the sense that, unlike convention, it
does not have to claim assent to what it enjoins. Secondly, it differs
7
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from arbitrary power, which may of course be actually compelling or
even right in its purposes, in the sense that it is self-perpetuating
(unverlefzbar). It may be violated but its right persists and, in
general, the law itself provides the conditions for its own termination
or continuance in force, though, as a matter of historical fact, something which begins as arbitrary force may later get this property of
inviolability. Accordingly, Stammler concludes that all law involves
four formal conditions: (i) It is a will, (2) which stands outside and
regulates subordinate wills in a cooperating community of subordinate
wills, (3)which is intrinsically or autonomously binding, and (4)
which is inviolable and in general self-perpetuating or self-terminating.2 9 This definition is alleged not to be dependent on usage or a
product of induction, but to be demonstrated by the critical analysis of the concept itself. If we mean less than this, we should not
mean law.
Upon the foundation thus laid, Stammler next proceeds, by a
further elaboration of his method, to present what he calls the "categories" of law,30 by which he means not kinds or classes of law but the
lines of thought necessarily followed where the concept of law is used.
Stamnler puts it as follows: "The processes of thought here described are necessary, fundamental concepts for any scientific critique
of any legal will. They signify an ordering process in all cases indispensable if the details of content in a legal will are to be defined in a
unified manner. For all consideration of any legal question consists
fundamentally in positing and pursuing ends by the use of right
means. But since every particular end that a legal will adopts may
in turn be regarded as a means to a further end, it is necessary for the
sake of systematic understanding to keep firm hold on the concept of a
final end and therefore on the definition of something intrinsically
capable of serving as the conditioning final term of a legally
ordered
series of ends."'" Corresponding to the four elements of the conception of law there are four pairs of correlative modes of reflection
about any law, or points of view under which the consideration of any
legal problem may be subsumed. The completeness of this list is
said to be guaranteed by the inevitableness of the definition of law.
First, there must always be something that is taken as the end and
something as the means to that end; second, there is a combination of
29

Stammler's formula runs as follows: law is "das unverletzbar selbstherrlich
verbindende Wollen"; RECHTSWISSENSCHArT C. i, § 16. Cf. the definition in
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1lbi4d. § 5.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
several wills for a common purpose and consequently a relation in
which these several wills stand to each other as contributing to that
purpose; third, there is the subordination of wills bound to a cooperative purpose in a lasting union to realize that purpose; and
fourth, there is always the possibility of disharmony between the
controlling will and the wills which it should direct and guide but
2
which possibly it does not.1
The categories of law thus developed have no particular reference to
justice; they are marks or characteristics of every law, whether just or
not. In the very relation of means and end, however, there is implicit, according to Stammler, the thought of a final end, a referencepoint toward which the whole series is directed. In the days when he
wrote a somewhat more florid style Stammler could even call this the
"guiding star" of human progress. It is quite true that this end
exists purely by implication. No society will ever reach it, and still
less can it ever be identified with any specific attainable end. In
detail it cannot be defined because we cannot even picture in imagination what concretely it would be like. It is possible, however,
by means of the critical method to develop a formula for it, and it is
possible also to use this formula in evaluating positive law. The
reference-point gives us a direction and we can say, more or less precisely, whether a given law is a step in that direction or not. The
formula follows, so it is held, merely from the conception of the will
and from the conception of the law as a binding will which constitutes a community of cooperating wills. The wills bound by the
law must still remain wills and so in a sense free,33 because will differs
from desire in setting before itself an end whose choice may be justified or the reverse. Its freedom consists in its escape from subjectivity, from the status of merely personal inclination or passion. Since
law is a binding will setting objectively valid ends, it ought to be
possible for everyone to acquiesce in the ends it sets. As an ideal,
therefore, the community which the law creates ought to be of such
a kind that everyone can freely cooperate with everyone else. The
3
Stammler's terms are as follows: i. Rechtssubjekt-Rechtsobjekt, corresponding to Wollen; 2. Rechtsgrund-Rechtsverklitnis, corresponding to bindendes; 3.
Rechtshohit-Rechtsunterstelligkeit, corresponding to selbstherrlich;4. Recztsmdssigkeit-Rechtswidrigkeit,corresponding to unverletzbar. Beyond these four simple
categories there is a very elaborate system of complex categories obtained by

considering two categories in conjunction; RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT C. ii, §§ 9 ff.

"3Stammler has always disclaimed any metaphysical meaning of freedom. Like
any Kantian he holds that the relation means-end is in a different universe of
discourse from cause-effect. There is no uncaused event, but such a phrase as
'caused end' would unite a term from each of two quite different relations; a sort
of logical mixed metaphor. Cf. WIRTSCHAFT uND REcHT § 65.
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formula for just law is a "community of freely willing men" and
toward this all positively law contributes, in so far as it is just.3 In so
far as anyone is really justified in willing anything, everybody ought
to be able to will the same, just as a true proposition is one which
everyone ought to be able to accept. The technique for using this
formula in the criticism of positive law, as we have seen, had been one
of Stammler's purposes from the first and to it he had devoted his best
known work.
We have now before us the, chief features of Stammler's critical
method in jurisprudence, and it is upon this that he himself would
base his claim to having contributed to the progress of the science.
He would claim moreover that it is really a science, scarcely less
rigorous than mathematics, so far as its general formulas are concerned. The substance of this claim lies in the contention that the
critical analysis of concepts exhibits not merely factors of usage, but
factors which must of necessity be used in the understanding of the
empirical realities conceived by means of them. They are actually
constitutive elements of things as known (or in Stammler's case, of
ends as justified). Consequently critical analysis is a logical operation
at least 5 on a parity with deduction and induction and therefore as
certainly valid as either of these. In short, Stammler assumes the
success of Kant's critical philosophy in dealing with the natural
sciences and he claims to have done the same thing for jurisprudence.
A critical estimate of Stammler's work presents great difficulties. To
try to separate his jurispruder'ce from the philosophy in which it is
imbedded violates every canon of historical criticism, because it falsifies the author's purpose at the start, and it is logically inconclusive,
because it amounts to using the term jurisprudence in a sense quite
different from Stammler's. On the other hand, it is impossible to
meet Stammler on his own ground without taking some sort of
position relative to the success or-failure of the Critical Philosophy as
a whole, and this question obviously cannot be settled in a few paragraphs. What I shall try to do is to make a few general statements
about Kant's critical method upon which I believe there would be a
considerable amount of agreement and which, in any case, will serve
to make clear the view that I am myself obliged to take of Stamnler's
jurisprudence.
At no time since Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason
a century and a half ago has there been anything like general agreecf. WIRTscHAFT UND REcHT § 99.
I say "at least" because I suppose Stammler would in fact regard criticism as

uInCHTSWISSENSCHAFT C. vi, §§ 7-9;

logically more fundamental than either deduction or induction.
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ment about what constituted its major results. On the contrary,
the influence which Kant exerted has always been extraordinarily
various. Consequently Stammler was taking a great deal for granted
when he assumed that there was a body of demonstrated Kantian conclusions about natural science which could form the analogue of his
own conclusions about jurisprudence. He was depending here upon
the finality of certain main conclusions of the Marburg School which
were a good deal more plausible in the 'go's than they are now.
The progress of the exact sciences has been definitely unfavorable to
the Kantian belief that necessary forms of scientific thought could be
isolated by analysing scientific conceptions. Kant's procedure resulted substantially in sanctifying Newton's mechanics and Euclidean
geometry as inevitable conditions of physical and mathematical
research-which they certainly are not. At the same time, the most
important developments in logic itself have owed little or nothing to
Kant and have quite abandoned the idea that there are logically
necessary forms of empirical existence. 36 In short, the not inconsiderable contribution of Kant (and also of the Marburg School)to
the study of scientific methodology will almost certainly turn out to be
not at all in the supposedly rigorous derivation of the necessary forms
of thought but rather in certain side-issues. Thus Kant's philosophy
undoubtedly did call attention to the importance of working hypotheses in science and to the presence in induction of presumptions for
which no rigorous demonstration is forthcoming. It also stimulated
the historical study of the postulates actually used by scientists.
But the deductions which Kant labored to make most rigorous would
be counted today by a great and a growing number of his critics as
among his most disastrous failures. Stammler was led by one of life's
little ironies to tie his jurisprudence to precisely that aspect of Kantianism which seems least likely to prove of lasting importance. The
erection of a new critical (or transcendental) logic beside deduction
and induction has not occurred and so far as can be seen will not
occur. The isolation of a limited list of categories which must always
make up the arsenal of scientific thought in its attack upon empirical
reality is less plausible than ever before, and even if there were such
categories it is most unlikely that they could be discovered and defined by merely analysing conceptions.
3
1The logical rigor of this procedure depends on a formalism much more thorough-going than that of Kant or Stammler, viz., the possibility of getting on quite
without empirical contents, either of perception or will, and hence of dispensing
with any-or any but the most general-reference to the existence of the entities
dealt with. The reader will find an excellent elementary description of this type
of logic in R. W. Eaton's GENERAL LoGIc (1931).
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If this be true of the Kantian theory of natural science, it is true a
fortiori of Stammler's "pure jurisprudence" which is supposed to
develop by analysis the "necessary" factors in the concept of law.
The inevitable deficiencies of the method are shown sufficiently well
by the result. Stammler gets out of the concept exactly what he has
first put into it. Avowedly, he is merely analysing the concept of a
will and exhibiting its necessary constituents.37 Under pressure the
concept yields social co6peration and its regulation, substantially as
these had appeared in Stammler's earlier study of the relation of law
to the social economy. This earlier study had convinced him that
law is best to be understood as the regulation and adjustment of wills
necessary to make cooperative social interchange effective and that
such regulated intercourse is the underlying fact that constitutes a
social group. Having reached this conclusion he imports the meaning into the concept of will and then by so-called critical analysis
extracts it from the concept. That the critical analysis would ever
have led to this result unless Stammler had known beforehand where
he meant to come out is utterly unlikely. In short, critical analysis
as Stammler uses it, and as Kant used it before him, is a pseudomethod which discovers nothing but baptises as a prioriwhatever its
user is sufficiently convinced of in advance.
A second main feature of Stammler's methodology is his belief that
there is a special class of teleological sciences (Zweckwissenschaft),
using the relation of means-end and requiring a distinct critical
analysis or logic of their own. While this conclusion was not adopted
from Kant, it is closely related to the critical procedure and to the
supposition that means-end is a unique sort of category belonging
necessarily to the will as cause-effect belongs to the data of senseperception. An acquaintance with the very doubtful status of causation as a category in the natural sciences might have warned Stammler that it would not be easy to set up means-end as the foundation of
another type of science, but that phase of the question may be passed
over. The truth seems to be that there is no logical peculiarity
whatever about the relation of means and end. There are, of course,
hundreds of relations known to logic, means-end among the number,
and each is unique in the sense that it is itself and not any other relation. But relations, like objects, have certain structures and are
classifiable. Whatever is true of the class will be true of any re7
3 RECTSWISSENSCHAFT C. i, § 9. In passing it may be remarked that Stammler's use of the word "necessary" is always baffling. Whatever the word properly
means-and there is little agreement among logicians--it certainly has no reference to an empirical subject-matter, whether perceptual or voluntary.
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lation in the class, and whatever the structure of the relation implies
will hold good for all cases of that relation-all of which is true of
means-end as it is true of other relations. But there is no peculiar
logic for means and ends or, to broaden the question, for any value
whatever. A logical inference about ends or values is exactly like a
logical inference about anything else, and in this very general sense
sciences that have to do with ends are just like other sciences. In fact,
logic is much more abstract than Stammler, with all his devotion to
abstractions, supposes it to be, since it is quite indifferent both to facts
and to values. Its implications are wholly hypothetical. If something is given as a fact or as a value, something else may logically
follow as a fact or value, but there is not the least reason for supposing
that logically any fact or any value has to be given.
This is of course in no sense a disproof of the contention, advanced
by Stammler and other jurists, that law is most properly to be understood as a means to an end. It does not even disprove the value of
the end which Stammler sets before law, viz., the realization of a
society of freely willing men. From the point of view of method,
the question here is the same as the question about the critical analysis of concepts generally. Can analysis prove that the mere concept of will necessitates a given formula for its ultimate end, even
though this end be admitted to be wholly lacking in empirical content? The objections on this point are substantially identical with
those already made to his effort to derive the categories of law from
the mere concept of will. Stammler's formula is in fact merely the restatement in other words of his underlying postulate that there is a
validity in the case of ends analogous to the truth of a proposition
which alleges a fact. The truth is something which, ideally at least,
every competent mind ought to be able to recognize, if it will fulfil
the conditions needed to make such recognition possible. Similarly
in a world of perfectly socialized beings Stammler supposes that ends
would be recognized as obligatory with the same sort of objective
validity, and his ground is simply the assertion that, without this
supposition, there is no validity at all in the case of the ends which
law and social institutions seem to be designed to reach. We must
choose between all or nothing: either there is a single ultimately valid
end or all ends are in the class of personal whims and caprices. The
strength of Stammler's position is derived wholly from the fact that no
man in his right mind fails to discriminate between ends that are important and those that are merely capricious, or between ends that
are socially valuable and those for which he himself has a merely subjective preference.
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The question is whether this fact, which clearly cannot be denied,
warrants Stammler's all-or-nothing postulate. We may pass over the
analogical part of the argument, viz., that we do presume a criterion
of this sort in the case of truth, though some would doubtless contest
it. But must we make the parallel assumption in the case of ends,
provided we apply any criterion at all in their choice? At all events
the conclusion is not self-evident, as Stammler virtually assumes.
Let us assume for a moment the exact opposite, viz., that ultimately
there is nothing to be said for an end except that someone does in
fact prefer it and that it is this purely subjective preference which
gives the end all the value it has. There is obviously no reason why
another person, or any number of persons, might not share this liking.
At least a good many human beings are pretty much the same in their
preferences, even if no preference is shared by all of them. And it
is hard to see why jurisprudence might not get along, even if it had
to content itself with some very rough average of this sort determined
in a purely inductive fashion. Stammler's contention that induction
itself is impossible unless we assume an absolute underlying regularity
overlooks all the uses of the calculation of probabilities, for whatever order probability requires certainly has nothing to do with means
and ends. Moreover, as we have seen, means and ends are no more
outside the scope of logic than any other relation. If two ends are
mutually incompatible, they are in that respect like any other incompatibles, and a contradiction is as disreputable in jurisprudence
or politics as anywhere else and for the same reasons. Finally, the
realization of ends requires certain factual or causal conditions which
are objective in exactly the same way when an end is in view as they
would be if no one proposed to make use of them. So far as these
physical or objective conditions are concerned, the end may be quite
irrelevant, but the objective conditions cannot be irrelevant if the end
is to be chosen and pursued.
Is there, then, anything which obviously prohibits a jurist, or
indeed any social scientist, from proceeding under the hypothesis
that these three types of objectivity or of mutual agreement are the
only ones which his science is obliged to postulate? In some unspecified degree--possibly far short of universality-human preferences are alike; at least, men's judgments in such matters will classify
like other variable material with some degree of probability. For
the rest, he will define his concepts and draw his inferences as exactly
as he can, according to the same logical rules of inference that anybody else uses, and where he appeals to objective conditions, psychological or physical, he will use the same body of facts and the same
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causal principles that he would have to use if no end were in question.
I am quite unable to see that such a view involves any absurdity
and I strongly suspect that it provides all the objectivity that anyone is warranted in assuming in a subject-matter which includes
human ends. Nor do I see that a person who takes such a view is
logically committed to the practical absurdity that all ends are on
the same level of whimsicality. If the view is tenable there is no need
whatever to accept Stammler's radical distinction between natural
sciences and teleological sciences, since all science is of a piece at
least so far as logic and fact are concerned. Equally, of course, there
is no objection to including ends wherever these are relevant, since
it is as easy to draw conclusions about ends as about anything else
that is equally complicated.
The conclusion to which I am forced, therefore, is that Stammler's
elaborate "criticism", by which he hopes to raise jurisprudence to the
level of a special kind of teleological science, is a failure. Criticism,
either in Stammler or in Kant, does not make good its claim to provide a logical method distinct from and in a sense underlying deduction and induction. The attempt to lay down in advance a
necessary form within which jurisprudence must fit is certainly not
more successful, but probably less so, than the same attempt for
physics. There is little if any reason to suppose that there are any
necessary forms that must always be taken by a factual subjectmatter, or that are intellectually indispensable for scientific understanding. In so far as there are relational factors in knowledge that
permit us to speak of logical implications, they are not dependent
upon.factual exemplification and indeed do not have any necessary
reference to matters of fact. All that criticism can do is to disentangle presumptions actually used, and this may be highly useful in
inducing self-consciousness about what is being taken for granted,
but it is'not at all the same thing as projecting in advance a body of
presumptions that science must always take for granted. This, it may
well be believed, surpasses the wit of man, and the attempt is more
aptly described as dogmatism than as criticism. For the same
reasons, it follows that Stammler's discrimination of a special class of
teleological sciences is certainly not necessary and is probably not
even useful.
III
Stammler's failure to produce a new method in jurisprudence and
to build up an a prioriproof of the results of that method does not
mean that these results are altogether lacking in significance. It
does mean, of course, that he has failed in his own conception of his
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work, but history is filled with failures of this kind which nevertheless had their importance. Thus it is possible for one of Stammler's
severest critics, Sir Paul Vinogradoff, to speak of the "admirable
precepts" of the theory of just law while asserting flatly that the
theory of legal categories has "no value for the advancement of
juridical thought". 8 It seems safe to assume that the value of Stammler's work, whatever it may be, lies in his contention that the conception of substantial justice as the end of law is an indispensable
part of jurisprudence. In the concluding part of this paper, therefore, I propose to lay aside entirely all questions of method, and look
at some phases of his treatment of this subject which may still have
considerable worth, whether they are or can be proved. 9 For the
sake of accuracy it will be well to remember that this is not a procedure of which Stammler would approve, since he has never believed that any idea was justified by what may be called its scientific
utility. In this respect I venture to think that he has sacrificed the
spirit to the letter of the Kantian philosophy, which has probably
accomplished more by calling attention to the importance of working
hypotheses than in any other way.
Stammler has always urged the view that a conscious and methodical consideration of ends is an element of all legal questions, both of
legislati6n and of decision. Moreover, the particular form of this
view which he has defended, viz., that the end of law is to do substantial justice, is at least as applicable and probably more appealing
than the utilitarian doctrine that the end of law is general happiness.
If it be true, as has been thought, that the conception of natural
justice was, on the whole, the strongest ideal motive making for the
enlightenment of European law, there is certainly no reason to
suppose that this motive has lost its power. In fact, it seems humanly
certain that this principle will be periodically appealed to, especially
when the existing law bears heavily upon a social class which is
rapidly becoming conscious of its political power and which feels that
it is discriminated against in comparison with other classes. It is easy
for utilitarians to overrate the extent to which men desire or expect
to be happy. The vast majority of men in the past have accepted a
large share of misery as their natural lot without envying very much
those who were less miserable. But the feeling that misery is an unnecessary degradation, removable by the use of adequate means and
3
'HIsTolucAL JURISPRUDENCE VoL I. (1920), p. 146. The passage is not very
clear
39 but I suppose the condemnation refers to the four categories of law.

Cf. Dean Pound's account of Stammler in The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence(1911) 25 HARV. L. REV. pp. 147-I54.
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corresponding to no intrinsic differences of worth that can be rationally justified, undoubtedly has great propulsive power. Thus the
sense of human dignity and worth has been deeply rooted in European
morals for upwards of two thousand years; it has been preached and
acted upon in every period of economic and political stress. The plain
fact is, also, that it is often easier to say what is just than what will
make men happy.
Probably the chief merit of Stammler's jurisprudence lies in, his
insistence that to do substantial justice is and must always be an end
inherent in the administration and the practice of law, which cannot
be pushed off by jurists upon someone else. To turn this question
over to the moralists or the philosophers, as the analytic jurists have
usually don'e, is merely a polite way of shelving it indefinitely, for
doing justice, if it amounts to anything, is a quite every-day affair;
if must be done in the course of the day's work and continuously from
day to day. For this reason Stammler has argued that the ideal of
justice ought to be part of the equipment even of the legal practitioner, who otherwise becomes a mere technician treating his
technique as an end in itself. 41 It is important to note that the
formalism which is complained of in Stammler's writings is not at
all the formalism of Begriffsjurisprudenz. If it does not seem too
paradoxical, we may say that he is offering his own formalism as a
cure for the formalism of the legal technician. What he aims at is
a mode of juristic reflection which always brings the doing of justice
into the picture as the end of the whole process. He is emphatic in
insisting that every legal situation is actual and empirical, arising
in the course of every-day human relations. His own formula for
justice is not put forward as a rule which can be followed but as a
guiding idea in the light of which the concrete provisions of the law
can be criticised. No one could reject more emphatically than
Stammler the notion that there are unchangeable rules of law. There
is only a point of view from which the actual content of every new
situation as it arises needs to be considered. The very thoroughness of Stammler's formalism forbids confusion between his principles of justice and any actual rule of law.
Even where there is a well established rule of law, it need not be of a
sort which tries to foresee all the eventualities that will arise or provide a major premise under which the court can subsume each new
case by a simple legal syllogism. There have, of course, been plenty
of instances of "strict" law, in which the legislature has undertaken
to frame a rule to fit every case as it comes up, but in a great and
40
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growing number of instances legislatures are not so ambitious. "Particularly interesting for the technique of modem law are those cases in
which the legislator decides certain specific questions in accordance
with a certain theory, and leaves to the lawyer to work out the theory
and settle the various questions arising therefrom" .41 According to
Stammler, the German Civil Code showed a definite tendency in this
direction in a number of important respects. Such law Stammler
calls "lenient" (gelindes); even silence in the law may be a means to
justice. The variety of circumstances being as great as it is, the
statement in advance of all that a rule ought to include is obviously
impossible and to attempt it merely places the just application of the
law in jeopardy. I presume we can see what Stammler has in mind
if we think of the endless variety of cases in which negligence is a
relevant conception. Legislation may give an indication of the
direction which decision ought to take but it is practically compelled to place upon the courts the responsibility of finding the precise
meaning which a rule ought to bear in the given case. Thus, Stammler argues, justice as the end to be achieved falls directly within the
cognizance of the court in a way in which it does not, if the rule to be
applied belongs to strict law. A "lenient" rule is something less than
a rule in the strict sense; it is a norm or type setting up a sort of
policy to be followed with due allowance for the great variety of cases
that have to be brought under it. Perhaps the most important
use that can be made of Stammler's distinction of form and matter in
the law-a use not wholly consonant with the rigidity of the distinction as he draws it-lies in this conception of legal rules as indicative of a line to be followed rather than as complete summations
of all the properties included in a legal concept. The rule thus becomes a juristic working hypothesis. It is unfortunate that this
emphasis, which might be called the spirit of the Kantian philosophy,
has been so completely overlain by the letter of the conceptual analysis.
At the same time it is only fair to Stammler to say that this idea
of the juristic working hypothesis did in fact underlie his effort to
formulate the principle of justice in a more precise way for juristic use.
Justice properly formulated can be applied and used as a directing
principle both for legislation and decision, and this contention was, I
think, the primary emphasis in the earlier presentation of his theory
of just law. It was this effort which led him to his well-known statement of the four principles of just law.4 What he reaches is, indeed,
only an elaboration of the famous categorical imperative of Kant's
ethics, that human beings are to be treated as ends and never as
411Wd. Bk. 11, C. iv; Engl. tr., p. 208.

-Ibid. Bk. II, C. ii.
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means merely. The elaboration takes account of Stammler's analysis of the conception. of society in the Wirtschaft und Recht which
had led him to conclude that law is the constitutive principle of a
society of cooperating wills. Hence he supplements the more strictly
Kantian law of Respect by the perhaps Platonic law of Participation.
The member of a society is not only worthy of respect as an end in
himself and must therefore be protected from the arbitrary impositions of another's will, but he is also entitled to share in the goods,
material and spiritual, which his labor helps to create and maintain.
Stammler then further elaborates each of these two laws by considering their fulfillment in two different legal respects: Both are conditions necessary to the existenceof any legal obligation at all and
also to the carrying out or effectuating of any legal obligation that
does exist. In this way he obtains what he calls the two principles of
Respect and the two principles of Participation." Whatever improvement this more elaborate statement may possess over that
given by Kant manifestly lies in Stammler's inclusion of the right to
share in the goods which society cooperatively creates. It is this.
which makes possible his careful discussion of subjects like limitations
upon the right of contract or the use of property."
The conception of community as a juristic working hypothesis
has an application considerably wider than the sociological community which exists as an actual group. It is an intellectual device or
a method of juristic reflection 5 and as such can be applied to individuals in every legal relation, such for example as a contract, even
though the persons so related are not in a relation of actual social
propinquity. Stammler argues that it is useful to think of persons
united by a bond of legal obligation as if they formed a special community (Sondergemninschaft), in order to understand the requirement
imposed by the relation and especially to discover what justice requires in the manner of giving effect to it. The legal bond, so to
speak, marks out a legal pattern in society at large, uniting the individuals concerned in a special cooperating community to accomplish
certain specific purposes. Such a community extends as far as the
relation runs; it may touch two persons only or it may run to any
43Stammler states the principles as follows: I. The Principles of Respect: i.
The content of one individual's will must not be subjected to the arbitrary power
of another. 2. Every legal requirement must be made effective in such a way that
the person obligated may still be regarded as an end in himself. II. The Principles of Participation: i. A person legally obligated must not be arbitrarily excluded from the legal community. 2. Every power of legal disposition must be
made exclusive in such a way that the person excluded may still remain an end
in himself. 4RICHTIGES REcHT, Bk. III, C. ii; C. v. § i. *Tbid., Bk. II, C. v. § 2.
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larger number. Those included may be interested in different degrees
and in different capacities. Third parties not directly within the
bond may still be concerned in the way in which the obligation is
made effective. Within such a special community, which is a community only in a "mental" sense for purposes of juristic reflection, the
principles of respect and participation should be used to guide legislation and also interpretation, if the law leaves any discretion to the
courts. Stammler's meaning may be illustrated by indemnity for
industrial accidents, 4 when the alternative is between placing the
whole cost of the accident on the employee and making it a charge
upon the industry and thus spreading it over all the consumers of the
product. In such cases justice requires the use of the notion of proportionality: a loss which will be staggering to an individual alone
maybea trifle when widely shared. Indeed,in urging the justice of shar47
ing losses Stammler is willing to go farther than the law has yet gone.
Both in theory and in practice there can be no doubt that Stammler's most fruitful idea was the inclusion of social participation as
part of the conception of justice. It is this which distinguishes his
jurisprudence most sharply from the traditional versions of natural
right. The similarity between Stammler's principle of respect and
Kant's categorical imperative is obvious, but between Stammler's
whole theory and Kant there is a significant difference. With Kant
respect is due to a human being as such and merely because of his
inherent humanity. With Stamnler the need for justice takes its
origin from the fact that law has to constitute a social group within
which the exchange of goods and services can supply human needs.
Injustice always violates the purpose of the community either by
putting a person outside the benefits which the community is designed
to confer or by making him subject to the merely arbitrary will of
another. 48 Stammler's principles of just law are therefore not individual rights, though they have to do with the treatment to be accorded individuals. They are requirements for the right constitution of a social group, or conditions for a healthy state of the body
politic, to use Plato's expression. For Stammler as for all social
idealists society is ultimately a spiritual phenomenon, a union of
minds for the creation and maintenance of a spiritual good which
has no existence except in the lives of individuals, while at the same
time individuals have no existence, and certainly no value, except
they as they develop themselves to share in it. The moral health of
the one requires the moral health of the other. Perhaps no name is
"Ibid., Bk. III, C. iii, § 3.
8
1 RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, C. viii,

47Ibid., Bk. III, C. i, § i.
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more appropriate than justice to describe this mutual implication. It
signifies that peculiar double status in which a being is at once means
and end and which is realized only in community.
If we place on one side Stammler's effort to create and demonstrate a new "critical" jurisprudence, which I believe to be definitely
a failure, his achievement must be judged by the value of the ideas
fundamental to his social idealism. He emphasized again the importance of regarding law as a means to an end and he reasserted the
claim of justice to be regarded as the best statement of the nature
of that end. Implicit in this position was the suggestion that legal
rules may most profitably be regarded as juristic working hypotheses
to guide decision rather than to predetermine it. This idea, which
might have been the most fruitful part of Stammler's jurispfudence,
is unfortunately crossed at every point by a growing fondness for a
priori proof, with the result that he accomplishes relatively little in
showing how the ideal of just law can be given concrete juristic
utility. In spite of a certain po~ver of intellectual construction
Stanrnler's mind appears to lack that robust grasp of realities which
in Kant was responsible at once for his worst inconsistencies and his
most penetrating insights, and which off-sets the school-masterly
pedantry of his methodology. Whatever Stammler did accomplish
in the direction of giving a more usable definition of justice must be
set down mainly to the fact that he supplemented Kant's categorical
imperative with the Platonic notion of participation. By so doing he
presented justice less as an individual right than as a requirement of
the social community itself and as an ineradicable condition of social
health. The importance of these ideals need not be denied, but after
they have been accepted we shall still be profoundly puzzled to know
what they meanin the concrete or what they involve in detail. Stammler's thought bears indelibly the impress of the i89o's, an era in which
a new sense of social responsibility flowered in a new statement of
social'idealism. In Stammler as in the Oxford idealists this took the
form of elaborating a very general principle of what may be called
social solidarity conceived in an ethical sense-the principle that
society has the duty of opening to a larger circle of the population the
positive means for sharing in the goods, especially the spiritual goods,
of a civilized community. Neither in Stammler nor in the English
idealists was there any adequate notion of the difficulties of making
this ideal effective, nor indeed any will to face the probably revolutionary changes in modem economy required to make it even approximately real. Hence they bequeathed to the next generation a
social philosophy less false in its main theses than vague in meaning
and uncertain in application.

